I did a right rudder hammer head stall at 10,000 feet in my Piper 140, I blacked out for a split second or two, came out around 5000 feet.
Never ever did that again. Had my best friend with me, never told what happened.
I used the aerobatic instructor for part of my commercial instruction after strong suggestions from a couple extremely experienced instructors. As the commercial rating is almost all done VFR and about extracting the maximum performance from a “complex” aircraft I went along with the suggestion.
The last two tasks in that check ride were a chandelle and a short field landing. Not all that hard, right? Wrong. The chandelle took place 1,000’ over very rugged high terrain, initiating and ending at Vmc. According to the test guide the maneuver was supposed to be initiated at maneuvering speed. I did not think it could be done starting at Vmc. So a maximum performance climbing course reversal was initiated with the stall warning horn blaring in a pre stall buffet. Altitude gained? About 15’ but according to the designee any more would have caused a spin entry.
The designee demanded the 172RG be landed “on the numbers and exit at the first turn off”. The first turn off was 300’ past the numbers. Normal “roll out” for a 172RG is in excess of 800’. The stall warning horn was blaring all the way through final and power had to be added before touchdown to prevent splaying the landing gear.
Not too long later I was grateful to have received such a “work out” I received from that aerobatic instructor. Departing a small airport nested in a valley surround by much higher terrain with a passenger in a PA28-160 a baffle broke off inside the exhaust header on one side of the engine, reducing engine power more than 50% at lift off. There was not enough runway remaining to abort. At an altitude of 50’ there was no possibility of a course reversal to make it back so the entire pattern had to be flown at Vmc. When turning base to final we had managed to gain another 150’, enough to clear things in our path and make a safe landing. Had that instructor not taught what he did this story could have never been told. We would have died because the knowledge needed to instantly recognize and execute what had to be done would not have been there.
Over the years I’ve looked back fondly on that instruction. Because of it dealing with different types of equipment failures, single mag failure in C-150 dual mag ignition which required an emergency landing at a naval air station, electrical system failure on a PA28-140, landing gear failure on a C172-RG, failure of the rear prop governor on a C-337 ferry flight, were a lot less stressful to deal with.
Never got into an excess G black out situation though.
